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The Horn of Africa has become an epicenter of interest for the global community due 
to the drastic increase in piracy. Indicative of the Gulf of Aden’s strategic importance 
is the fact that more than 30,000 ships per year and 3 million barrels of oil per day 
transit the Suez Canal. Indicative of the severity of the problem of piracy is the fact 
that more than 30 countries are committing naval forces as part of a solution to the 
problem. The international community seeks to secure the area and protect the global 
economy. 
This paper attempts to provide an innovative sustainable capacity building 
conceptual model to tackle piracy through the employment of cutting edge 
technological assets, i.e tethered aerostat radar sensors, UAVs and picosatellites. The 
economic and technical feasibility of the proposed conceptual model is tackled 
respectively by illustrating a scenario and providing an economic cost benefit 
approach regarding the cost of the proposed infrastructure. The conceptual model 
consists of a complex set of various components that, together, build an integrated 
architectural set constituting an innovative, alternative capacity-building model 
aiming to secure maritime traffic corridors, and at the same reducing the economic 

















 The last two decades, the Horn of Africa (HoA) has become the epicenter of 
interest for the global community due to the drastic increase in piracy. The challenge 
of piracy is recognized globally; the special conditions of this area create a unique set 
of considerations and circumstances for policy makers. Indicative of the severity of 
the problem is the number of think tanks and regional experts that have focused on 
this issue, as well as the fact that more than thirty countries are committing naval 
forces as part of a solution to the piracy problem. However, a solution that requires 
the economic support of a large number of naval units patrolling has a severe 
economic impact. Although this deployment of naval forces provides our navies a 
solid objective, no government expects or wants its naval forces to become part of a 
permanent anti-piracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden. The international community in 
contemporary times is facing serious challenges in many domains. The only tool 
historically proven capable of addressing these challenges is Capacity Building. 
The major research question this paper attempts to answer is the following:   
Which capacity-building strategy in the Horn of Africa will most likely produce 
a solution to the piracy problem? 
1. CAUSAL MECHANISM OF PIRACY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 
The literature on this issue concludes that the causal mechanism of piracy in 
the Horn of Africa includes the following factors: “intrastate conflicts, geography, 
cultural shifts, ship owner policy, and weak political and security enforcement 
institutions [1].” For the past two decades, Somalia has been suffering from a civil 
war between clans, ending up being a failed state. Likewise, due to domestic issues, 
Yemen is facing the danger of becoming a failed state. Both of these countries are 
involuntary hosts to pirate groups because internal conflicts provide pirates the 
supportive environment to direct and conduct operations. Geography plays an 
important role [2]. Somalia’s coastline is estimated to be around 2000 miles long. 
Since no coastguard or navy patrols these waters, pirates are able to conduct their 
operations from a number of different bases with impunity.  Historically, the rise of 
piracy has been supported by the proximity of the Gulf of Aden to the Suez Canal.  
Yemen’s geography is also attractive to pirates due to its long coastline and 
proximity to high-traffic maritime corridors [2]. 
2. CAPACITY BUILDING IN THE HoA 
 The causal factors of piracy in the HoA clearly demonstrate the problematic 
nature of this issue by stressing its domestic and international dimensions.  
Consequently, it becomes obvious that only a consistent capacity building policy 
against piracy will effectively address this issue.  
Capacity building can be defined as:  
Planned development of (or increase in) knowledge, output rate, 
management, skills, and other capabilities of an organization through 
acquisition, incentives, technology, and/or training   [3]   
The best way to address the piracy threat is by considering the complexities 
in the area on all levels, from societal fragmentation in clans and sub-clans to 
specific geographic features of the region. Furthermore, in principle, some basic geo-
political considerations must govern this policy, in particular, anti piracy efforts 
should be based on local, regional, and international collaboration; otherwise, all 
efforts to deal with this issue will ultimately fail [4]. The international community 
can offer temporary solutions by deploying naval task forces (i.e., Operation Atlanta 
/ Ocean Shield / Allied Provider) or by providing weak littoral states with logistical 
support and aid to exercise more effective maritime control over their areas of 
responsibility. However, both methods mean many countries must incur a significant 
economic burden [4]. 
. 
The issue of piracy can be addressed permanently only when the involved 
states establish and have strong local institutions, such as police and coastguard 
forces.  The moment such strong local institutions evolve the level of all criminality 
including piracy will be reduced significantly. Capacity Building is the best path to 
accomplish a permanent solution. However, this cannot occur over a short period, but 
only after a coordinated series of efforts from the international community in 
cooperation with locals [4].  
 However, the impact of piracy is global and its cost is estimated to be in the 
range of 0.5 -1 $billion annually. The political situation in Somalia has been in a 
stalemate since 1992, after the disastrous 1991 UN intervention. The international 
community is very hesitant to deploy ground forces.  
Capacity building against piracy, as has been eluded previously, should have 
a domestic, regional, and international component. Consequently, a modern 
antipiracy strategy should entail an “innovative non-kinetic policy [5].” In particular, 
this paper proposes the adoption of a model analogous to the model developed for 
the Maritime Domain Protection in the Straits of Malacca in 2005 by the NPS Meyer 
Institute. Specifically, consolidating all anti-piracy efforts under one command 
would significantly boost the efficiency of the disposed naval patrolling forces in the 
area [5]. Furthermore, this paper proposes the establishment of a large scale, air-
monitoring system supported by naval assets.  This air monitoring system would 
primarily consist of tethered aerostats with embedded radar sensors, suitable for 
maritime domain surveillance. However, the international community, through 
organizations like NATO, should support navies from regional countries through 
institutions specialized in providing anti-piracy training. One institution providing 
the discussed training operating in accordance with NATO standards is the NATO 
Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center (NMIOTC) in Crete, Greece. 
Through NMIOTC, NATO offers such required training in the following fields: 
“MIO plan development,  Surface, subsurface and aerial surveillance , Boarding 
process , MIO aspects of Special Operations , MOTC courses to the members of 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) and MD (Mediterranean Dialogue) countries   [6].” 
The first step against piracy should support the local communities 
economically in order to provide young Somalis opportunities and incentives to 
reject the prospect of becoming pirates.  Somalia is composed of three different 
political entities, Somaliland, Puntland, and the area under the control of the official 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Although, the TFG has a limited role, since 
the area under its rule is estimated to be only a few building blocks in Mogadishu, 
the governing authorities of Puntland and Somaliland on a domestic level have 
proven to be efficient in building strong local institutions, i.e., coastguard and police, 
and their efforts should be supported [5]. Another promising development that 
requires further support is the Somali Coastguard that was recently founded; 
however, it is poorly equipped, operating only a dozen of skiffs. A policy 
strengthening equipment wise and enhancing the “know how” of the local 
institutions of the political entities in the area would cause a drastic reduction of 
piracy incidents since it would allow law enforcement mechanisms to put their hands 
on pirates on their own court [5].  
The modern maritime environment presents many challenges to the 
international community. The issue of piracy is a hot issue in the global security 
arena, since 70% of the earth’s surface is covered from water and the vast majority of 
humanity is highly dependent on the sea and its goods. Although more than 30 
countries have deployed naval forces, in 2009 there was an increase in piracy attacks, 
reaching 196 attacks [7]. Furthermore, as it was eluded previously, a sustainability 
issue is generated since it is highly questionable if the involved countries would 
continue contributing naval forces and on the same time producing moderate 
operational results in regards to the number of piracy incidents. The statistics from 
the IMB in 2009 are a clear indication that a different policy should be pursued that 
is more efficient and less expensive and aims in employing cutting edge 
technological assets as the ones described below. 
3. TETHERED AEROSTAT RADAR SENSORS 
a. History and Current Deployments  
Aerostat operations date from the American Civil War, and since then they 
have been heavily utilized operationally in the field. Today, aerostats are deployed in 
a wide spectrum of operations, covering from operations in Afghanistan to a 
monitoring system in the southern borders of the United States for drug interdiction. 
The Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) area of responsibility covers the 
southern US border from Mexico to the Caribbean. The latter monitoring system was 
established in the 1980s and each aerostat is embedded with a radar sensor.  
Specifically, the TARS system payload consists of AN/DPS-5 S-band CFAR/MTI 
and AN/TPS-63 search radars. The operational endurance of aerostats can last up to a 
month and their footprint is around 200 miles [8].  
b. Description of Tethered Aerostats   
Tethered aerostats form a category of air systems that can be easily 
characterized as non- conventional since they do not have fixed rotary wings. The 
majority of these network balloon systems are employed in surveillance missions 
with embedded radars, consist of four main parts, “Radar sensor, wind screen, 
airborne power generator, rigging tether assembly and hull [8].”  
The majority of hulls are manufactured out of polyurethane-coated fabric. 
The upper part is larger and contains the required helium to remain at the proper 
altitude. The ballonet lower part is subject to the effect of pressure, and its shape is 
affected by the various pressure changes related to the aerostat altitude. The 
windscreen is also under helium pressure and is the compartment facilitating the 
radar [8]. 
c. Operational Advantages From Using Tethered Aerostats 
Currently, there is strong debate over unmanned air assets and how they can 
be optimally utilized. Inevitably, this discussion involves aerostats and what they can 
offer to tackle modern challenges mankind is facing. In regards to maritime domain 
surveillance, this technology can offer a number of serious advantages. Aerostats can 
assume a variety of roles based on the wide variety of payloads they can carry. In 
particular, they can function as communication relay assets, but there is also great 
potential in ISR missions. In maritime missions, especially the main need emerging 
from modern security issues is to create sea-based assets able to detect and identify 
threats in a timely manner [8]. The role that seems fit for aerostats is “persistent 
surveillance”; this paper proposes a conceptual model, which consists of an air 
monitoring system for high-traffic maritime zones [9]. 
Another set of advantages is that currently similar systems are already 
operational and there is a general body of knowledge available concerning the range 
of capabilities and limitations. An important aspect of employing aerostats in 
maritime surveillance missions is the fact that their economic costs are low and they 
have a long period of operational life. Yet another argument supporting their use is 
their low radar cross section and they are fabricated in a fashion that builds in 
resistance to various punctures [8]. However, a caveat when utilizing aerostats is that 
they are affected when strong winds are blowing. Practically, while meteorological 
phenomena of strong winds occur in an area, an alternative method of conducting 
ISR should be at hand and pursued until a technological solution is found to bypass 
this limitation [8]. 
 
Figure 1. JLENS schematics 
However, another interesting application concerning the operational usage of 
aerostats is based on a concept developed by the U.S. Coastguard in the1980s and 
1990s. Specifically, the concept was based on a naval asset that had an embedded 
aerostat system that was launched when required. These assets were utilized against 
drug smugglers with success; their main task was to provide surveillance information 
to the other patrolling units in the area [10].  
An innovative approach against piracy would involve the development of 
modern units capable of carrying aerostats with a large footprint, equipped with 
advanced radar systems delivering high resolution capable of identifying pirate’s 
mother ships [10]. 
 
Figure 2. The operational concept when deploying ships with an embedded 
radar system (From [10]) 
Figure 2 illustrates the concept behind an operational scheme employing 
embedded aerostats on naval assets. Obviously, one of the advantages of deploying 
an asset as described above is the fact that it can be considered a sea-based unit 
capable of covering a large area for a long period of time in the heart of the problem, 
significantly reduces reaction time, when supported accordingly. The operational 
advantage when deploying ships with an embedded aerostat radar system lies on the 
rapid detection of potential pirate’s mother ships [10].  
Another promising application of maritime surveillance systems based on the 
utilization of tethered aerostats would be what is currently being developed by the 
Israeli Armed Forces and has received considerable interest from other countries. In 
2009 India procured two (EL/M 2083) Aerostat Radars. However, EL/M 2083 radar 
mainly function is against low fast moving aircraft [11]. On the other hand, a 
maritime application of a tethered aerostat constellation system could be embedded 
with a radar system designed to operate in a maritime environment, taking into 
account that the discussed aerostat system could safely maintain an altitude of 15,000 
feet, and carry a payload of up to two tones. In particular, the main challenge in 
securing a maritime domain through this concept is the acquisition of radar capable 
of covering an area of such size with high resolution. A trustworthy solution might 
involve the utilization of 3D, phased-array radar system [11].  
4. UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVS) 
According to the 2003 Naval Transformation Roadmap, Information 
Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities will be greatly enhanced when the 
next generation of air assets is officially deployed. Specifically, UAVs that are 
tasked to perform maritime surveillance equipped with various sensors and that are 
networked will play an important role in the “reach, coverage and persistence of the 
naval Information Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) system across the full range of 
the intelligence spectrum [12].” Future advanced maritime networks involve a 
comprehensive set of “air assets, manned and unmanned, and sea-based and land-
based assets [12].” 
a. Innovative Use of UAVS on Maritime Domain Awareness in the Horn 
of Africa 
The Hellenic Naval Academy (HNA) is developing a mini Helicopter that 
presents significant potential in the area of maritime domain awareness in the HoA. 
The mini-helicopter is named Vellerofontis, and was obtained from the commercial 
sector. The capabilities provided through this mini-helicopter are a comparative 
advantage over other UAVs including the ability to perform a short take off and to 
land on a ship deck [13].  
 
Figure 3. Vellerofontis during a flight carrying a camera streaming video (from 
[13]) 
Vellerofontis is remotely controlled and carries a video camera that can be also 
remotely controlled. The main operational characteristics of Vellerofontis are shown 
in Table 1 [13]: 
Characteristics  Metrics 
Useful load ~ 4kgr 
Range ~ 7 nm 
Speed 80-100 Km/h 
Camera FOV 30∘ 
Table 1.   Vellerofontis operational characteristics 
Vellerofontis includes these promising capabilities [13]: 
1. Secure Image Transmission. 
2. A flight system capable of conducting an autonomous flight 
with predefined flights.  
3. Integration of an IR or Synthetic Aperture Camera as a sensor 
system that can transmit real time Video.  
4. Integration of a light WMD sensor.  
In sum, Vellerofontis introduces an innovative way to tackle threats related to 
the Maritime Domain Awareness at a very low price. The low cost in accord with the 
small size, makes it possible to utilize Vellerofontis in a number of cases.  In 
boarding operations, Vellerofontis could be deployed in advance to conduct pre-
boarding checks and assure the existence of the necessary pre-conditions for the 
boarding team to be actually deployed. Furthermore, in the near future, Vellerofontis 
could potentially carry a WMD sensor and relay signals indicating the existence of 
WMD material back to a central unit for further evaluation. Vellerofontis is currently 
used for training purposes in NMIOTC, and the lessons learned from various training 
exercises clearly indicate the large number of potential applications in maritime 
interdiction operations [13]. 
5. Maritime scenario 
A. PURPOSE 
The main scope of the scenario described is to demonstrate the feasibility of 
conceptual models that would tackle the issue of piracy effectively in the sea 
commons, specifically in the Horn of Africa. The proposed conceptual model 
consists of a complex set of various components and which together build an 
integrated architectural set constituting an innovative, alternative approach into 
securing maritime traffic corridors. Apart from specific assumptions explicitly stated 
below, the scenario does not take into account the contemporary regional diplomatic 
and political agenda that develops in the Horn of Africa. The long-term objective of 
this study is to produce a conceptual model that, under proper modifications, could 
provide an alternative solution to the issue of piracy and is characterized by three 
main features: 
(a) Cost effectiveness 
(b) Advanced Technologically 
(c) Participation of regional countries 
B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) 
In order to discover the optimal configuration of advanced technological 
assets, it is fundamentally important to explicitly state the proposed concept of 
operations (CONOPS) and avoid misdirecting efforts. 
 CONOPS:  The Operational utilization of cutting-edge technological assets 
(Tethered Aerostats + suitable radar sensors) in conjunction with a Maritime 
Command and Control Fusion Center and with the support of a minimal number of 
naval assets (Naval and Coastguard Units) would provide an alternative solution to 
address piracy, regardless of the political anomalies happening ashore.  Based from 
the previously described CONOPS, the discussed infrastructure should be supported 
by an advanced network mechanism. In particular, the network mechanism should 
support the following key elements: 
1. Sensors 
The ultimate objective of a sensor system tasked to monitor a maritime 
domain is to provide as consistently reliable 24/7 real time picture, as less possible 
affected by extreme weather conditions. The main features of a sensor system 
satisfying the criteria for monitoring a maritime domain like the Gulf of Aden are 
listed below: “Continuous coverage of all Areas of Responsibilities (AORs), 
Capability of utilizing alternative Sensors in case of default, interconnectivity, 
scalability and mobility, advanced network infrastructure, high information quality  
[14].”  
2.  Maritime Command and Control Fusion Center 
The infrastructure discussed in this paper should be also supported through a 
command and control center stationed in one of the relatively political stable 
countries of the region, since the compilation of maritime picture is a complex and 
challenging task. The Maritime Command and Control Fusion center would consist 
of two main sub-departments: 
a. Command and Control Center (C2) 
b. Fusion Center 
The fusion center gathering all the information would be located in a stable 
strategic location in the Gulf of Aden, i.e Socotra Island, Somaliland. This C2 center 
would collect all the information, starting with the tethered aerostats, and notify 
merchant ships transiting in the area by all available means.  
C. FUTURE MARITIME NETWORKS 
Every maritime challenge should be addressed driven by the quote stated 
below by Giulio Douhet, an Italian strategist in 1921:  
Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character 
of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes 
occur [15]. 
This paper proposes the implementation of innovative concepts and 
technologies to reduce naval units to the minimum number required to interdict 
pirate groups that remain undetected—and endanger the safe transit of merchant 
ships. Consequently, an imperative need is born to develop maritime networks 
competent enough to monitor and deter pirate groups. Specifically, to successfully 
counter piracy, it is crucial to improve the recognized maritime picture, providing 
tactical commanders optimum situational awareness. Necessarily, maritime security 
depends on maritime surveillance, and there are inherit obstacles to be bypassed 
when conducting surveillance in an area as large as the Horn of Africa.  
Tactical commanders require an information infrastructure that is 
interconnected and supported by cutting-edge technologies.                                                     
The architecture of a Command and Control  
System network is composed of the following subsystems, which are integrated and 
form nodes: “navigation components, command and fusion centers, communication 
links, decision components (i.e. computers), sensors [16].”  
One might expect that with the available volume of information, pirates can 
be easily deterred. However, this is not always the case, since a key factor to 
successfully conducting anti-piracy operations is to effectively process all the 
available information. A crucial component of the latter process is to identify all the 
important data, and after a reliable “data mining” process, to utilize them in the 
decision making process [17]. The following statement should dictate what the 
international community and coalition forces should attempt to establish in the 
future:  
“Tactical networks or network centric systems, in which multiple 
sensors or geographically distributed units of highly mobile decision 
makers transfer and analyze data while operating on the move in 
distant areas  [17] ”. 
It is quite evident that this approach of building maritime networks is 
applicable and adaptable to networks whose architecture includes a high number of 
nodes. Building a network is a relatively common procedure; however, in cases 
where the objective is to build wide networks, with architectures of numerous nodes, 
experimentation is required in order to test and evaluate fundamental system 
properties (i.e., hierarchy, adaptation, etc) [18]. 
D. NETWORK HIERARCHY 
Hierarchy is a fundamental property in networks and defines the network 
architecture significantly. Consequently, it is important to present the network 
hierarchy in order to analytically depict the operating mechanism of the proposed 
conceptual model. Every network has its own characteristics and specifically, the 
number of layers n and the contents of each layer.  Likewise, the quality and quantity 
of information shared between layers is exclusively designed for any individual 
network. In particular, there is one common principle always: the scope of each layer 
is to offer a specific type and amount of information to higher layers [20].  
For successful communication between layers a specific set of rules and 
procedures   should be followed; otherwise, there is a strong chance that the 
communication would fail. The set of these procedures and rules is officially 
described as a communication protocol. Furthermore, a key aspect of this agreement 
between layers is the interface used each time the layers communicate [20].  
Many times a need emerges to redesign the network architecture   in order to 
facilitate the augmented needs for data fusion and dissemination. In particular, the 
network infrastructure supporting   ISR efforts against piracy should be able to deal 
more effectively with the information load between the “processing the analytic 
power resident afloat and the capacity ashore and reach-back nodes, as well [12].” 
E. COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS 
The communication features of the communication scheme that would be 
able to support the needs for the discussed conceptual model are the following: 
“Accommodate mobile nodes, interoperable with existing systems, bi-directional 
channel, asymmetric bandwidth, Digital, time latency [14].”  
A look at the above sensor requirements and to the relevant literature would 
suggest that networks should be considered as a “set of nodes interconnected through 
a number of links [21].” In particular, this work refers to a maritime domain 
protection system that would employ a set of sensors    to detect, deter and provide 
senior commanders the ability to conduct anti-piracy operations.  A mesh network 
structure in conjunction with a hierarchical structure appears to be the best network 
configuration to adopt. 











Figure 4. Proposed Communication Scheme 
Figure 4 clearly depicts the structure of a hierarchical communication scheme 
that satisfies modern operational standards and provides flexibility as well.  
F. MARITIME SCENARIOS FOR CONSIDERATION 
In their book, Alberts and Hayes refer to the experimentation campaign 
concept as follows:  
“A series of related activities that explore and mature knowledge 
about a concept of interest.  Experimentation campaigns use the 
different types of experiments in a logical way to move from an idea 
or concept to some demonstrated military capability. Hence, 
experimentation campaigns are organized ways of testing innovations 
that allow refinement and support increased understanding over time 
[18] ”
The development of an initial concept to a concrete objective is a complicated task 
that requires a series of consecutive experiments structured in a logical sequence in 
order to reach the optimal result.  
. 
1. Pareto Efficiency 
The Pareto set, along with the design parameters and the functional 
constraints, lay the foundation to start configuring the required maritime network to 
effectively support a Command and Control (C2) system that monitors a maritime 
domain in the wider area of the Horn of Africa. However, this does not imply that 
this is a static process; on the contrary, it is a dynamic process that constantly has to 
receive feedback in order to satisfy the rapidly increasing user needs. In particular, 
the network experts manage and modify when required the design variables [20]. In 
other words, when dealing with practical problems, that include so many variants 
every optimization effort presents a great challenge. The Pareto criteria set provides a 
great tool for researchers aiming to address ad-hoc multi-objective optimization 
problems, and study the relationships between the design variables, functional 
constraints and the criteria constraints that evaluate whether the outcome is 
acceptable or not. Specifically, C2 in Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) is an 
ideal area to apply this tool since C2 is by default is dynamic and constantly evolving 
[20]. 
2. Objective 
The main objective of this scenario is to explore and gain further insight into 
how an adaptive set of sub-hierarchical networks supporting the operational use of 
cutting edge technological sensors (aerostats + suitable radar sensors) in conjunction 
with naval assets, the majority provided from regional countries (Yemen, Seychelles, 
Somalia, Kenya), can be utilized in the Gulf of Aden for securing the Sea Lines of 
Comms (SLOC) from piracy.     
3. Design Variables 
Network design variables are independent features that can be structured in a 
fashion that the best outcome is produced for the whole process. The first 
challenging step is to identify all the involved variables and list them in order to 
progress with the next steps of the procedure. Another important aspect is to fully 
define all the design variables in conjunction with the proper metrics. The last step   
provides the optimal solution   to manipulate each time the design variables   to 
optimize the final outcome. The table below presents the fundamental design 
variables. During the whole process this paper’s objective was to treat the system as 
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4. Functional Constraints 
The functional constraints in the network offer an accurate insight into the 
capabilities that are available for the discussed network. Specifically, these 
constraints are being imposed by the surrounding environment and, if not satisfied, 
most likely the designed variables are neither applicable nor feasible. Conversely, 
this does not mean they are “a priori” fixed and cannot be negotiated [21]. Rapid 
technological development is providing plenty of tools to overcome difficult 
situations or obstacles that in the near past seemed impossible. In our case, the 
functional constraints are mostly technological and economic. In the following table, 
four functional constraints are presented, stressing the issue of maximum bi-
directional information, reliability and the economic cost of this infrastructure. 
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The scenario defines 
significantly the 
development and flow of 
the scenario each time 
Level of 
complexity 
Table 3.   Functional Constraints 
The functional constrains are time and the chosen scenario. For the scenario 
developed in this paper, time is constrained by the activities defined in the scenario 
that occur in the assigned period, and as well by the economic cost. 
5. Partial Relationships for Experimentation 
Alberts and Hayes have usefully argued  that by defining a complete set of 
design variables, they render their problem   significantly less complex. 
Unfortunately, this is valid  is because of the large number of relationships between 
all the variables, and that in most cases only a few relationships are thoroughly 
studied. All of these relationships provide each respective system particular   
strengths and weaknesses. However, the latter situation does not always work 
negatively since one of the reasons for conducting experiments is to study the 
dynamic relationships between design variables [18]-[21]. 
6. Scenario Overview 
The main objective is to secure a zone that extends from 100 to 300 nautical 
miles from the coastal lines. For this zone, the idea is to utilize innovative 
technologies and concepts such as the combined   use of tethered aerostats equipped 
with radar sensors and AIS equipment in conjunction with the support of naval assets 
patrolling the area. The number of assets and their level of technological 
development and the number, as well, of involved actors constitute the establishment 
of a fusion center mandatory, structured in way capable of processing all the 
gathered data and forward all the information towards the naval units. However, our 
attention remains on a wider area adjacent to the 100 nm zone off the coastline. 
Specifically, the area of interested is the zone between 100 and 300 nm away from 
the coastline of Somalia. This area could be monitored through tethered aerostats 
equipped with suitable radar sensors (see Fig. 5).   
The scenario would discuss a capacity building strategy based on a regional 
and an international level.  However, it is important to make some crucial 
assumptions; otherwise, our scenario could be easily characterized as utopia.  The 
current conditions regarding the Somali Transnational Federal Government (TFG) 
are quite difficult, in as much as it controls a very small percentage of the whole 
country. Consequently, for this scenario we assume   that   domestic conditions   will 
improve at least to a level permitting the foundation of a coastguard and police. 
7.  Scenario Initial Experimentation Plan 
In this scenario, two merchant ships considered as HVUs transit across the 
west coastline of Somalia. One is carrying humanitarian aid to Mogadishu, and the 
other is carrying radioactive material. The Maritime C2 and Fusion center receives 
intelligence of high credibility indicating that a pirate attack is imminent in the short 
term. 
 





Figure 6. Schematic Depiction of the Proposed Air Monitoring System 
Figures 5 and 6 offer a schematic depiction of the proposed air monitoring 
system with respect to the Somali coastline. This constitutes an initial approach; 
there is room and space to consider the exact geographic particularities and details, 
and since one of the main advantages of aerostat radar systems is their mobility  
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Figure 7. Footprint Aerostat Area of Coverage 
The main technological assets proposed in this paper are tethered aerostats 
with embedded radar and AIS equipment, capable of providing an effective footprint 
of 200 nm. In the conceptual model described (every aerostat monitored area), a 
naval asset is disposed to patrol and act when the circumstances compel for it.  
8. Scenario Narrative 
The scenario is based on the assumption that the TFG government has 
assumed positive control over a small number of coastal cities; after the increase of 
active participation from regional institutions, i.e., the African Union, or individual 
neighboring countries in the level of peacekeeping contribution. There is a great 
incentive for the international community to deliver humanitarian aid. It is also 
assumed from the collection of credible intelligence indicates that there is a high 
possibility of pirate groups high jacking a merchant ship that carries radioactive 
material.  Also, weather conditions are moderate. The main challenge is to maintain a 
constant flow of information regarding the location and the status of these HVUs 
and, in case of danger, to react timely.  
 Ship 1 
A merchant ship is carrying humanitarian aid under the umbrella of the 
World Food Program (WFP). The ship carries a large shipment with final destination 
the port of Mogadishu. The ship, in accordance with IMO requirements, is equipped 
with an AIS transponder / receiver. The C2 Center is coordinating efforts in order for 
the ship to arrive safely in Mogadishu. In the event of an unidentified contact in the 
monitored areas, the merchant ship will be instantly notified to alter its course   and a 
naval unit will engage the suspect vessel under orders of C2 center. 
• SHIP CHARACTERISTICS:   
 Length: 400 meters 
 Width: 40 meters 
 Tonnage: 100,000 tons  
 Economic Speed: 14 kts 
SHIP ITINERARY 
TIMELINE COURSE OF EVENTS REMARKS 
DAY 1 
Ship enters the international 
maritime traffic corridor. 
Ship is monitored from the 
C2 center. 
 
Speed : 14 
Kts 
DAY  2 
The ship continues its 
voyage without any 
interruption in the monitored 
areas. During the transit the 
C2 center collects 
information that pirate 
groups might attack a ship 
so, the C2 instructs to a 
naval asset to escort the unit 
and the ship to alter its 
initially scheduled course 
 
Speed : 14 
Kts 
and proceed easterly. 
DAY   3 
The ship approaches the 
harbor of Mogadishu under 
the discreet monitoring of 




Table 4.   Scenario 1 Ship Itinerary  
 
Figure 8. Schematic Illustration of the Merchant Ship's Entrance to Mogadishu 
        Ship 2 
• SHIP CHARACTERISTICS:   
 Length: 450 meters 
 Width: 40 meters 
 Tonnage: 200,000 tones 
 Economic Speed: 13 knots 
The merchant ship in this case carries radioactive material. The priority for 
the international community is to assure safe transit of the ship and, in the event that 
an attack occurs, to react proactively and deter pirates from high jacking the ship.  In 
the event of an unidentified contact in the monitored areas, the merchant ship will be 
notified instantly to alter its course and speed and allow the naval unit to engage the 










The ship enters the international 
maritime traffic corridor. 
 Ship is monitored from the C2 center 
 
Speed : 13 Kts 
 
DAY  2 
During transit, after the appearance of 
unidentified contacts, potential pirate 
mother ships, the ship alters its course 
and the naval asset of the respective 
area escorts the merchant as long as 
the danger of the threat lasts.  
 
Speed : 13 Kts 
DAY   3 
 














Figure 9. Schematic Illustration of the Merchant Ship's Transit 
9. Criteria Constraints 
The final part of a well-designed scenario inevitably includes a post-analysis 
phase. This is an issue of fundamental importance since it allows the evaluation of all 
the collected data in depth. The criteria constraints are a tool enabling involved 
personnel to process all the acquired data. Access feasibility is a crucial feature of 
this mechanism [18].  
The criteria constraints are of crucial importance since they provide the 
capability to determine whether the final product is acceptable in various aspects. 
Inverting the problem, the design and functional constraints must be structured in 
accordance with criteria constraints. The table below is a synopsis of the criteria to 
be examined to determine the functionality and whether the described conceptual 
model can be considered as robust [18]. 
 
NAME DEFINITION METRICS 
Average 
Throughput 




Characterize the quality of the 
information in respect to the factor 







The time difference between the 





a ratio over actual and allowed loss for 









Table 6.   Criteria constraints 
The three leading principles that should dictate the data collection process 
are:  “Validity reliability, credibility.”  A very important feature of this process is the 
access availability [18].  
5. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF A TETHERED AEROSTAT AIR 
MONITORING SYSTEM  
A major component in all decision-making processes is the amount of funds 
required to transform and implement a proposed concept. Even if the outcome of a 
concept might be definitely positive, if the amount of money required is extremely 
high the concept is turned down.  In particular, according to system engineering 
theory for a project to achieve the optimal affordability and meet the budget 
standards the whole process should be monitored at every step described below: 
Acquisition Cost: Research, design, testing, production and 
Construction, Operational Cost: Salary Cost, facilities, utilities, and energy 
consumption. Product Distribution Cost: Shipping and Handling. Software 
Cost: Development, operating, and maintenance software. Maintenance 
Cost:  Customer service, onsite personnel training, supply and reserves, test 
and support equipment. Training Cost: Operator and maintenance training. 
Supply Support Cost: Spares, Inventory, and Material Support. Retirement 
and Disposal [19].”  
The costs stated above, added together are called the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) 
should always be taken into account since they constitute practically the total cost of 
the project over its expected life cycle. Practically, the technical side is tackled first, 
and then the economic aspect is addressed. In sum, to analytically compute/estimate 
the total cost of a large technological infrastructure that utilizes assets not widely 
operated includes areas of uncertainty regarding the exact economic cost.   Any effort 
to accurately estimate the total cost of the proposed air monitoring system in this 
paper is subject to a lot of criticism [19].  
A. ECONOMIC COST OF NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE horn OF 
Africa 
In 2008, there was a dramatic increase in piracy incidents. The international 
community was forced to act immediately and decisively to secure the Sea Commons 
in the Gulf of Aden by heavily deploying naval assets in the area. In particular, more   
than 30 countries   under the leadership of the United States have formed CTF 151, a 
coalition with the ultimate objective of fight maritime terrorism, including piracy in 
the Middle East. In 2009 the total number of naval ships participating in anti-piracy 
efforts was around thirty, all year long on a 24/7 mission [23].  
Any effort to compute the precise economic cost of the naval deployments in 
the area inevitably will include an area of uncertainty, since there are always indirect 
costs that cannot be accurately defined. On the other hand, due to the massive 
deployment of naval assets, from various organizations an estimate of the total 
economic cost is feasible. The average deployment cost of a frigate size ship is 
estimated to be around $1.3 million per month. Since the average number of ships 
patrolling in the area is thirty, we can conclude that a minimum cost of the 
deployments in the area is around $40 million per month [23].  
Indicative also of the cost of fighting piracy in this fashion is that in 2009 the 
EU spent approximately $450 million supporting operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR) 
The U.S., in fiscal year 2009, spent $64 million through Central Command 
supporting US flagged ships patrolling in the HoA. In addition to the cost above is 
the cost originating from ships deployed by independent countries to tackle piracy 
[23].  
The economic cost of the naval deployments discussed above raises 
important questions. In particular, the total economic cost of naval deployments 
fighting piracy every month exceeds $ 0.5 billion dollars. Another indirect cost that 
should be eluded is the opportunity cost for the contributing countries, since for 
every country would be different. In particular the reduction of naval units patrolling 
in the area would offer the countries an option of deploying their assets in other areas 
where their national interests are in stake [23].  
A high economic cost of that magnitude generates a sustainability issue in the 
long run since many countries now contributing forces most likely would not have 
the capacity to contribute forces for a long period of time, in light of the economic 
recession that is impacting a great number of countries. 
B. ECONOMIC COST OF PROPOSED AIR MONITORING SYSTEM 
The computation of the exact economic cost is a complex process that 
overwhelms the scope of this paper; however, it is important to present an economic 
outline of the proposed air monitoring infrastructure in order to present the 
feasibility and the economic benefits of adopting a capacity building strategy that 
utilizes the discussed innovative technological assets.  
In particular, the costs involved have to do with the procurement, operating 
and support costs. Even with the large number of uncertainties, the procurement cost 
of the balloons varies from $20 to $100 million, depending on the size and the 
offered set of capabilities of the payloads. Furthermore, an important component of 
these advanced technological assets is the embedded sensor, for which a reasonable 
estimate is $20 million. In addition, the operating and supporting cost is estimated to 
be in the range of hundreds of dollars of per hour. Consequently, considering the 
most demanding scenario of a 24/7 operation for 365 days, the supporting and 
operating cost is in the range of million dollars per year. For example, if the cost is 
$700 hundred an hour the total annual cost reaches approximately $6 million per 
year [9].  
However, apart from the stand alone economic analysis, there is an 
imperative need to include an operational component in this pursuit and, in 
particular, with issues related to the maritime domain and specifically the efficiency 
in regards to maritime surveillance [23].  
An approach that seems to offer an accurate depiction of the economic 
benefits of the discussed innovative assets in maritime surveillance is the cost to 
cover one square km; the ratio between the economic cost ($) and the covered area 
(m²). Aerostats with embedded radar sensors as payloads can maintain an effective 
footprint of 150 nm radius, as opposed to radar sensors carried by naval units that 
provide an effective coverage that reaches a surveillance circle with a radius of 30 
nm.  
The next step is to compare the two methods of surveillance on an economic 
basis in order to determine whether there is potential in introducing this out-of-the-
box approach as a countermeasure against piracy. An average cost per year including 
support and operating costs is approximately $6 million. Consequently, the discussed 
ratios are approximately: 
For an aerostat: $6 M / π * (150) ²= $85 / km²  
For a ship: $12 *1.3M/ π * (30) ²=$5520/ km²  
The ratio between the figures computed above is rather indicative of the 
economic benefits in adopting a new model to accomplish maritime surveillance. On the 
other hand, considering that the minimum cost for a ship operating in the area is $1.3 
million per month and there are more than 25 ships patrolling in the area. The average 
annual cost of naval deployments exceeds $ 0.5 billion [23]. In addition to the previously 
stated cost , the economic cost from the ransom should be taken also into account into 
particular the Somali pirated have collected an amount which exceeds $100 million since 
2007, since the ship owner policy is supporting piracy by paying ransom fees [23]. 
The issue of piracy, despite the international interest it has received and the 
actions taken by the international community, in particular the deployment of naval 
forces, remains on the agenda and requires even more attention and action from 
international global players. Indicative of the serious escalation of the issue is the 
dramatic increase of piracy incidents in the wider area of the Horn of Africa and in 
other areas like the South China Sea, and off the Nigerian coasts. The current 
situation has led pirate groups to operate in areas out of reach from naval patrols and 
in neighboring seas. The current method of tackling piracy by sending naval forces is 
partially effective, but at the same time causes a great economic burden that exceeds 
the amount of one billion dollars per month [23].  
The rise of piracy in the security agenda has brought to the table a whole new 
question of determining the optimal capacity building strategy to address piracy 
considering that pirate groups have adopted new tactics and take advantage of the 
political instability in Somalia and in neighboring countries. The domestic politic 
situation does not allow any drastic action on a domestic level to fight pirates. 
However this does not mean that the existing political entities in Somalia 
(Somaliland and Puntland) should not be supported in regards to equipment and 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
“know how in strengthening local institutions like coastguard and police. 
Consequently, the strategic importance of sea commons would eventually force the 
international community to successfully address this phenomenon by utilizing cutting 
edge technological assets and implementing innovative operational concepts. 
Regarding piracy, the international community should try to think 
innovatively and integrate operational concepts that can meet the challenges of 
piracy nowadays, considering the occurrence of piracy attacks in a large number of 
areas that cannot be predicted. In particular, a network of balloons with embedded 
radar sensors and AIS equipment offers an easily deployable solution in conjunction 
with a supporting intelligence policy would lead to augmented ISR capabilities 
constituting an advanced anti-piracy tactic. 
Since political instability in the wider area of the Horn of Africa is common 
and the prospect of overcoming this political problem does not appear in the near 
future, a different capacity building strategy should be pursued.  The main objectives 
of the capacity-building strategy presented in this paper focuses on utilizing 
innovative technological assets that are easily deployed, not geographically 
anchored, and, in addition, offer augmented ISR capabilities. Technological assets 
incorporating all the previously discussed features are tethered aerostats with 
embedded sensors, specific UAVs and satellite assets. Despite the virtues of the 
discussed proposed capacity model it should always be kept in mind that a long time 
commitment is required and the goal during this whole process should be to achieve 
the highest level of contribution from regional players. An important feature of the 
cutting- edge technological assets presented in this thesis is the comparatively low 
economic cost that justifies the continuation of the research in this field despite the 
fact that in the end the capacity model described might not be the one adopted.   
The scenario discussed in this paper aims to demonstrate the feasibility of the 
proposed conceptual model and how it could be applied in securing maritime 
corridors. However, since the economic aspect is a catalyst, an initial economic 
approach was attempted in order to determine whether there is any potential in 
further pursuing a potential application of the described model. Despite the fact that 
this approach included a significant number of uncertainties and assumptions, it 
finally yielded to promising results, economic wise. Consequently, the continuation 
of this research is more than welcome since even a partial adoption of the discussed 
model would provide significant economic benefits and in addition allows the 
involved countries to deploy their assets in other areas of need where their national 
interests compel for the deployment of naval assets. 
Finally, it is important to consider that with the complicated contemporary 
political agenda in countries where piracy occurs, it is very difficult to totally 
eliminate piracy incidents; however the goal should be the drastic reduction of piracy 
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